William & Mary Law Review
Volume 38 (1996-1997)
Issue 1 W.M. Keck Foundation Forum on the
Teaching of Legal Ethics

Article 6

October 1996

Legal Education, Experiential Education, and Professional
Responsibility
James E. Moliterno

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Part of the Legal Education Commons, and the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility
Commons

Repository Citation
James E. Moliterno, Legal Education, Experiential Education, and Professional Responsibility, 38
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 71 (1996), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss1/6
Copyright c 1996 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr

LEGAL EDUCATION, EXPERIENTIAL EDUCATION, AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
JAMES E. MOLITERNO*
I. INTRODUCTION

Picture five lawyers as each enters the legal profession in
subsequent generations, each having received the best legal
education of the time.
1. In 1875, Alan Anderson became a lawyer after four years of
apprenticeship with a mentor.' Alan had received a formal
education through the tenth grade. During the four years with
his mentor, he read from Blackstone2 and Coke;' he observed
his mentor consulting with clients and performing in court;
under supervision, he drafted wills, real estate documents, and
pleadings; he dined or lunched with nearly every member of the
local bar. He possessed a deep understanding of the small sliver
of the legal profession that was relevant to his life. He had considerable experience with the interpersonal skills that are valuable to a lawyer, although his exposure to the theory behind
those interactions was limited to whatever he could draw from
the example set by his mentor and other local lawyers whom he
observed. In contrast, he had no academic education, either legal
or general. Without such education, Alan had almost no understanding of the larger aspects of the legal profession, of the effects of modern developments in tort and products liability law,

* Professor of Law and Director of the Legal Skills Program at the College of
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1. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE
1850s TO THE 1980s 25 (1983).
2. See 1 WILLIAM BLACESTONE, COMMENTARIES (1765).
3. See 1 EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND (1797).
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nor of the impact on the law made by the industrial revolution
that took place around him.
Alan benefitted from extensive experiential learning, but received very little experiential education:4 he learned much about
little from the haphazard series of experiences that came his
way during the four years with his mentor. Beyond a reading of
Sharswood,5 his exposure to the law and ethics governing lawyers was limited to whatever he gleaned from watching the ways
in which lawyers behaved.
2. In 1910, Bernard Baker became a lawyer after having graduated from a modern, Harvard-model law school. 6 Like many,
but not all, of his classmates, he began law school after receiving
a four-year college degree.' He learned according to the
Langdellian style of scientific legal method.8 The library was his
laboratory, the cases were his data. His mental processes followed the scientific method from hypothesis through data gathering to result. He read little of Blackstone' or Coke.'0 Instead
he read appellate decisions and engaged in searching classroom
dissection of them with his professors and classmates.
Throughout his three-year law school experience, he was placed
in the mental role of a scientific lawyer applying legal doctrine
on a daily basis. An educator designed and planned that experience, along with the materials used. Bernard's exposure to other
activities of lawyers was minimal, largely limited to moot courts.
The only clients in his legal education were names in cases, all
of them considered utterly irrelevant in the educational process.
His comprehension of a lawyer's work was limited to a deep
understanding of utilizing the scientific method to analyze common law materials. He also knew much about the common law

4. The differences between experiential learning and
notes 22-43 and accompanying text.
5. See generally GEORGE SHARSWOOD, PROFESSIONAL
Co., 5th ed. 1993) (1896) (advocating the building and
tion among fellow lawyers).
6. For a discussion of the Harvard model instituted

education are discussed infra
ETHICS (Fred B. Rothman &
protection of a good reputaby Dean Christopher Colum-

bus Langdell, see ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD 162-205 (1967).

7. See STEVENS, supra note 1, at 15 n.146.
8. Id.
9. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 1-4.

10. See COKE, supra note 3, at 1.
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rules of property, contracts, and torts; he knew the rules of civil
pleading.
Bernard benefitted from a great deal of experiential education,
but it was limited to a single topic: the scientific method of
thinking as engaged in by lawyers. His experiential learning
was similarly limited to observations on this same topic."
Like Alan's, Bernard's exposure to the law and ethics governing lawyers was limited to a reading of Sharswood. 2 Bernard's
social background, his early practice experience under the tutelage of a senior lawyer, and the academic rigor of his legal education all shaped his character as a lawyer.
Between 1875 and 1910, legal education underwent a nearly
180 degree turn: cases replaced treatises, classrooms replaced
law offices and courtrooms; ordered, planned materials replaced
a haphazard course of instruction; academic-led education replaced practitioner-led education; academic analytical skills replaced practical client and interpersonal skills."3 I said "nearly
180 degree turn" for a reason: Bernard, like Alan, still had a
considerable experiential component to his legal education.
Those experiential components, while undoubtedly effective,
were fully and squarely aimed at different purposes.
3. In 1948, Carl Connor became a lawyer after having graduated from a modern, Columbia-Yale-model law school, dominated
by Legal Realist thought. 4 Like all of his classmates, he began
law school after receiving a four-year college degree. He was
taught largely in a classroom style that on its surface could have
been mistaken for the Langdellian style. The Columbia-Yale
classroom style was certainly as rigorous as the Harvard model.
It mainly used appellate decisions as classroom materials; it
primarily was conducted in a form that came to be described as
a "Socratic" dialogue between professor and students, and it was
conducted almost entirely in a classroom as opposed to a
lawyer's office or a courtroom. The Legal Realists, however, re-

11. See infra notes 22-43 and accompanying text.
12. For an example of an ethics text that was influential at the turn of the century, see generally SHARSWOOD, supra note 5.
13. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 6, at 175.
14. For a discussion of Legal Realism at Columbia and Yale, see LAURA KALMAN,
LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 67-97 (1986).
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jected the Harvard model's purely "hard" science approach to
legal analysis and, instead, introduced the perspective and
methods of "soft" science.15 Nevertheless, much of Carl's legal
education was conducted in a way not markedly different from
Bernard's. Like Bernard's, Carl's education was also about the
thought processes of lawyers engaged in the analysis of law. The
thought processes changed, but the mode of education did not.
The thought processes Carl learned included the social scientific
methods along with the hard scientific method imperfectly applied to learning law during Bernard's time.
Carl benefitted from a great deal of experiential education
regarding a single topic: the thinking process engaged in by
lawyers. His experiential learning likewise was limited to observations on this same topic.
Carl was exposed to the law and ethics governing lawyers by
means of a successor to Elliott Cheatham's Legal Profession
course, which was first introduced at Columbia in 1933.16 In

this class, Carl studied the ABA Canons in the context of the
history and structure of the legal profession. 7 A great deal of
his character as a lawyer was formed by his early exposure to
senior lawyers in practice and to the academic rigor of his legal
education.
Carl's legal education was as different from Alan's as Alan's
was from Bernard's. Although both Carl and Bernard were educated in the thought processes of lawyers, Carl's model of lawyerly thought included social science-oriented thinking and skepticism; Bernard's model did not.
4. In 1980, Dana Dickenson became a lawyer by following an
educational path strikingly similar to Carl's path. Many of the
attributes of his education were mirrored by hers. For example,
Legal Realist thought and its progeny dominated her law
school's jurisprudence as it did Carl's. Like all of her classmates,
Dana began law school after receiving a four-year college degree.
Also like Carl, Dana was taught largely in a classroom style

15. Id.
16.

FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL HISTORY, A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF

LAW: COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 323 (Julius Goebel, Jr. ed., 1955) [hereinafter Goebel].
17. See id. at 323-24.
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that, on its surface, might have been mistaken for the
Langdellian style. It, too, was rigorous, using appellate cases as
the basis for a Socratic dialogue conducted almost entirely in a
classroom as opposed to a lawyer's office or a courtroom.
In four ways, however, Dana's education was markedly different from her predecessors'. First, Dana and about thirty percent
of her classmates were women; 8 their presence brought new
perspectives to the law that affected jurisprudence. Women's
perspectives were not significant in Alan's, Bernard's, or Carl's
legal education. Second, the curriculum of Dana's law school
included a few prototypical skills courses, most of which were
elective. 9 When well-conceived, these courses addressed a particular segment of the thought processes of lawyers associated
with activities such as counselling clients, negotiating, advocating, and writing, rather than the application of legal doctrine
and theory. Third, Dana was among a fortunate group of about
twenty-five percent of her classmates who experienced a clinical
course during law school. Most law schools offered elective, limited enrollment clinical studies. 0 In these courses, students
experienced the broader aspects of the lawyer's role in client representation, while under faculty supervision. Dana met and
counselled clients, drafted documents, and advocated in court.
Although the clinic deliberately accepted only certain categories
of cases, Dana's experience was largely haphazard, not unlike
Alan's entire apprenticeship. This haphazardness, although
realistic, was not conducive to an organized educational experience. Finally, Dana was required to take a semester-long course
called 'Professional Responsibility." Taught largely through the
same classroom methodology as were her courses in contracts
and torts, this course taught the law governing lawyers through
the examination of legal doctrine as revealed in cases, but with
an additional emphasis on the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility.
-In terms of experiential education, Dana benefitted from exposure to similar thought processes of lawyers, as did Carl and

18. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 246 (1983).
19. Id. at 240.
20. See id. at 240-41.
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Bernard. She gained some limited additional experience with
other lawyerly activities through her clinic, although the clinic,
like Alan's apprenticeship, presented more experiential learning
opportunities than experiential education opportunities. Her
professional responsibility course, although a vast improvement
over simply reading Sharswood,2" was taught by applying law
to problems, the same method used in her torts and contracts
courses.
5. In 2010, Emily Ethridge will become a lawyer after graduating from a law school that is a model of early twenty-first
century innovations in American legal education. The structure
of the curriculum will not be 180 degrees from anything described above; it will be thirty or sixty or ninety degrees from
everything. Legal education will retain the primary emphasis on
the experience of the lawyer's application-of-law thought process,
but this emphasis will not be nearly as exclusive as it might
have been in Bernard's or Carl's education. Courses will continue to be taught using cases and supplementary materials as
they have been taught since Carl's time. Classroom education in
contracts and torts will be similar to that of Carl's day, despite
having been changed by shifts in jurisprudential thought.
In terms of experiential education, Emily will benefit from the
same sort of experiences with the thought process of lawyers as
did Dana, Carl, and Bernard. Emily's legal education, however,
will include a three-year long simulated law practice. The simulations will provide experiential education involving a wide variety of thought processes associated with activities other than the
application of law to facts. This simulation will cover the ethics
and law of lawyering using a combination of methodologies that
address the same thought processes addressed in the "cases and
materials" courses and the clinical courses. The program's creators will have attempted to provide a designed, ordered apprenticeship for all students. The combination of classroom work,
experiential in the same sense as was Bernard's education, and
the three-year ethics and skills simulation program, experiential
in that it will introduce a wide variety of other lawyerly thought
processes and activities, will provide Emily with a well-balanced
21. See SHARSWOOD, supra note 5.
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preparation for entry into the legal profession.
Other consequential changes will have altered legal education
by Emily's time. Fewer in-house, live-client clinics will exist in
2010 than existed in the 1980s and 1990s. Both the practicing
and academic branches of the profession will view legal education, and, particularly education in the ethical norms of the
profession, as a partnership to a far greater extent than was
previously the case.
For legal education to advance to what Emily Ethridge will
experience, professional responsibility teaching must change to a
more experiential style. This change, which has already begun,
will not be completed easily. It will be expensive and wrenching.
It will disrupt patterns in legal education that have existed for
over a century. It will require new resource allocations and perhaps new resource generation at a time when limited current
resources are being diminished or eliminated. This change in
legal education generally will begin with professional responsibility teaching and will spread, ultimately in more limited but
nonetheless real ways, to the entire law school curriculum.
New resources will be found in the near-total elimination of
live-client, in-house clinics, in foundation grants, and in a consortium of public and private legal sector employers that will
pool their training resources to fund comprehensive skills and
ethics development programs that will be demonstrably better at
preparing law students for the rigors of legal practice, including
the confrontation of ethical issues. This resource pooling will
diminish the effects of the serious free-rider problem that has
deterred employers from expending more resources on training
programs. Currently, employers have no useful way to protect
their investment in training law students. The changes will, in
some ways, make legal education more like medical and other
professional education, but will not abandon what has been good
about legal education, such as training in legal analysis through
the case method and rigorous statutory analysis in conjunction
with the teaching of substantive law.
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II. EXPERIENTIAL EDUCATION AND EPERIENTIAL LEARNING
Although they are receiving renewed interest,22 experiential
education and experiential learning are not new to legal education or professional education in general."
Learning is not education, and experiential learning differs
from experiential education.24 Learning happens with or with-

out teachers and institutions.25 For example, eavesdroppers
learn about the things they hear,26 yet they are not educated
simply by the act of eavesdropping because the activity is not
accompanied by a teacher's or institution's participation in the
learning process. Education, in contrast to a learning opportunity, consists of a designed, managed, and guided experience.27
The apprentice form of legal education outlined in the Alan
Anderson hypothetical was primarily an experiential learning
opportunity. The learning was guided in only a very limited
sense by the mentor. The arrangement chiefly suited the needs
of the mentor and was arranged according to the mentor's business needs, not the educational needs of the apprentice." In
22. See, e.g., LEARNING TO EFFECT (Ronald Barnett ed., 1992); PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING, ISSUES, AND PROSPECTS
(Solomon Hoberman & Sidney Mailick eds., 1994) [hereinafter PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION]; Symposium, Experiential Learning: A New Approach, 62 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR
ADULT & CONTINUING EDUC. 1 (1994).
23. European medical education, for example, has its roots in the field experiences
of French Napoleonic era battlefield doctors. See Dora B. Weiner, French Doctors
Face War 1792-1815, in FROM THE ANCIEN RPGIME TO THE POPULAR FRONT 51
(Charles K. Warner ed., 1969); see generally JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION (1938) (interpreting education as the scientific method by which individuals
study the world to acquire knowledge); KURT LEWIN, FIELD THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (Dorwin Cartwright ed., 1951) (characterizing the social scientist's essential
task as the translation of phenomena into concepts); Carl Rogers, Toward a Theory
of Creativity, in CREATIVITY AND ITS CULTIVATION (1959) (arguing that experiential
education is transferable from experience to experience).
24. See Lewis Jackson & Doug MacIsaac, Introduction to a New Approach to Experiential Learning,62 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR ADULT & CONTINUING EDUC. 17, 22-23 (1994).
25. Ronald Barnett, What Effects? What Outcomes?, in LEARNING TO EFFECT, supra
note 22, at 3, 4.
26. Id.
27. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 24.
28. In describing the advantages of a casebook over the haphazard order of an
apprentice's experiences, Ames said:
[I]f a lawyer's office were conducted purely in the interest of the student,
and if, by some magician's power, the lawyer could command an unfail-
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modern legal education, summer job experiences, unsupervised
externships, moot court competitions, and law review memberships are all largely experiential learning opportunities. Although students learn a great deal through participation in
these activities, they are only one part of an educational experience. In the law school environment, these activities are surrounded by other opportunities designed to enable students to
take something useful from these unguided learning opportunities. The organized, designed, and guided educational activity
has been either loosely or closely linked to the experiential
learning activity.
When the organized activity is closely linked to the experiential learning, experiential education occurs. For example, suppose that a student takes a contracts course and learns the
doctrine relating to unconscionability. At some later point in his
law school years, he does an externship at the local Legal Aid
office. At Legal Aid, he meets and works for a client who has
entered into a one-sided, adhesive, consumer contract. The student might later say that he never really understood the unconscionability doctrine until he worked on the case at Legal Aid.
The student's reaction would be genuine, even if slightly off
the mark. In fact, the understanding or learning has come from
the combination of his classroom activity and the Legal Aid
experience; his current level of understanding unconscionability
would probably not exist in the absence of either of the two
learning experiences. A loose link existed between the educational activity in his contracts class and his experiential learning
activity at Legal Aid. That this specific client matter was assigned to this student at Legal Aid, of course, was fortuitous.
The contracts teacher and the Legal Aid lawyer-supervisor are
separate people with separate goals.
The relationship between the traditional professional responsibility course and the student's Legal Aid experience may be
analogous. The student learned the confidentiality doctrine in
ing supply of clients with all sorts of cases, and could so order the coming of these clients as one would arrange the topics of a scientific lawbook, we should have the law-student's paradise.
James B. Ames, The Vocation of the Law Professor, 48 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 140

(1900).
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class by reading and discussing Model Rule 1.6,9 Upjohn Co. v.
0 In re Ryder,"' People v. Meredith,
3 2 United
United States,"
States v. Zolin,3 and Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co. 34 The same student, after representing a client,
might remark that he never really understood the duty of confidentiality until a client confided in him at Legal Aid. Again, the
link is loose. Because of the subject matter of the professional
responsibility course, however, a strong possibility exists that a
very large percentage of the students in the class will someday
receive the confidences of a client, creating the expectation of an
eventual link between classroom and real-world experiences.
In contrast to the foregoing, loose-link hypotheticals, a close
link between two experiences occurs when the same teacher is
responsible for guiding both experiences, or when two or more
teachers are responsible and are members of a commonly motivated team.3 5 When this close link exists, the two experiences
will be parts of an explicitly coordinated experiential education
activity. The discussion of confidentiality doctrine and the confidentiality experience with the client will be organized to coincide
or follow one shortly after the other so that the student can
readily place the experience in a theoretical and legal framework, and can reflect on the experience and refine the effectiveness of the theory.
Since the time of Christopher Columbus Langdell's revolution,
legal education has anticipated and proceeded on the basis of
Carl Rogers's theory that "the only learning that really sticks is
that which is self discovered."3 6 Experiential education proceeds

29.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1992) (generally prohibit-

ing a lawyer from revealing confidential information unless the client consents after
consultation).
30. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
31. 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va.), affd, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967).
32. 631 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1981).
33. 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
34. 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974).
35. Examples of efforts to use these approaches are found at the University of
Maryland, see David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching
in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 64 n.134 (1995), and at William &
Mary in the Legal Skills Program, see infra nn. 192-95 and accompanying text.
36. Rogers, supra note 23, at 243.
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through the process of synthesis that Dewey, and later Lewin,
outlined: students are exposed to the theory of an activity; they
experience the activity; they reflect on the relationship between
the theory and the experience and synthesize the two; they form
7
a new or modified theory; they test it by experience, and so on."
The experiential education approach provides the student
with something that other educational models do not: "an internal locus of evaluation."38 This internal locus of evaluation allows students to self-learn.39 It provides students with a pattern for continued learning from experience that is largely
transferable.4" When, however, the thinking or analysis skills
differ markedly from one learned activity to another, the learning pattern must be created through experience with the different activities.4 '
From Langdell's revolution until fairly recently, legal education has provided students with only one experiential education
activity: lawyer as a reader and retrospective applier of the
law.42 It is true that the repeated activity of legal education-that is, reading appellate cases and discussing them in
order to extract doctrine and theory, followed by student reflection on the law-reading activity, also followed by more law reading to extract doctrine and theory-has been extremely successful at teaching a single, unquestionably critical, lawyerly skill
and activity through the model of the lawyer's retrospective
thinking experience. As useful, and indeed central, as that activity is for lawyers, its learning pattern differs from that of other
lawyerly activities in critical ways. The traditional model of
legal education has been focused so narrowly on this single activity as to be extremely unsuccessful at educating students for

37. See DEWEY, supra note 23, at 42; LEWIN, supra note 23, at 69-72; Solomon
Hoberman & Sidney Mailick, Frame of Reference, in PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, supra
note 22, at 3, 19.
38. Rogers, supra note 23, at 247.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. A contrary view of the value of this teaching is well-expressed by Paul N.
Savoy, Toward a New Politics of Legal Education, 79 YALE L.J. 444, 460 (1970) (offering the view that the case method effects thought reform rather than teaches legal analysis).
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any other lawyerly activity.4 3 This failure has its greatest deleterious effect on the teaching of professional responsibility law
and theory, where the widest possible range of lawyerly activities are in fact the substance that shapes the legal rules and informs the theory. In truth, the rest of the substantive law may
be more effectively and efficiently taught through current methods, but professional responsibility is about the role of lawyer,
and its teaching is not so easily separable from the experience in
that role.
III. FROM ALAN TO DANA
In this section, I will trace a brief history of experiential
learning and education in legal education, contrasting at points
with the medical education model and its history of experiential
education. I will suggest four reasons why medical education
developed into a far more experiential education-oriented model
and why legal education has thus far not done so. Of these reasons, only one, relating to resources, continues to be a restraint
on expansion of experiential education in legal education. As
such, I will suggest that legal education, especially professional
responsibility education, should become more experiential if an
efficient model for it can be constructed.
How did legal education wind its way from Alan Anderson's
experience to Dana Dickenson's? Why did its association with
experiential education differ so markedly from medical
education's association with experiential education?
Langdell's revolution generated an incredible change in legal
education and in legal theory.' Although the Realists largely
discredited Langdell's innovations in legal theory,4 5 his innovative teaching methods remain the most influential and pervasive
of models.4" With respect to experiential learning, the change
from the apprentice system to classroom-focused appellate case

43. See STEVENS, supra note 1, at 74.
44. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 6, at 162-205.
45. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1960); Karl N.
Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-TheNext Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930).
46. STEVENS, supra note 1, at xv.
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reading signified a near total reversal. Experiential learning
dominated the apprentice system. The apprentice's activities in
the mentor's law practice, combined only with the reading of
available treatises, prepared the student for entry into the profession. By contrast, the Harvard model eliminated all experiences save one, that of reading appellate cases to learn doctrine,
theory, and skills relative to legal analysis. 7 Because the Harvard method was planned and controlled, however, it did provide
experiential education in a way that the experiential learningbased apprentice system could not. The Harvard model provided
experiential education of the lawyer's role as law reader and
analyzer.
As dramatically as legal education changed in the late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-centuries, it was not the only model
of professional education that was undergoing dramatic change
at that time. Indeed, the timing of legal education's revolution,
and the role of at least one of the key players in it, coincided
with the "scientification" of higher education in general and of
medical education in particular.48 Further, these changes in
professional education coincided with a more general move toward professionalization and institutionalization in America."
Harvard President Charles W. Eliot, who encouraged
Langdell's experiment 0 in the face of significant opposition, 1

47. SUTHERLAND, supra note 6, at 174.
48. Robert H. Ebert, Medical Education, in PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, supra note
22, at 41, 44.
49. See generally DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS (1973) (describing the institutionalization of higher learning); MAGALI S. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1977) (analyzing the history of British and
American professionalism).
50. See, e.g., 2 CHARLES WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND OF
EARLY LEGAL CONDITIONS IN AMERICA 395-97 (quoting Charles W. Eliot, President's
Annual Report for 1874-75).

51. That resistance is well-expressed in an 1883 letter from Harvard Law Dean
Ephraim Gurney to Harvard President Charles W. Eliot, lamenting that Langdell's
ideal is to:
breed professors of Law, not practitioners; erring, as it seems to me, on
the other side from the other schools, which would make only practitio-

ners. Now to my mind it will be a dark day for the School when either
of these views is able to dominate the other, and the more dangerous
success of the two would be the doctrinaire because it would starve the
School. In my judgment ....

if ...

the School commits itself to the

84
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was doing so as a part of a broader university reform effort."
The effort encompassed changes in the sciences, the medical
school, and the law school.53 These changes focused on the
adoption of teaching methodologies that would enable students
to develop the modes of analysis and the practices of professionals in their fields of study.5 4 The changes moved the schools
away from reading and lecture and toward experiential education.55 For the hard sciences and the medical school, Eliot recommended labs, field experiences, and a teaching hospital, along
with the clinical instruction that attends those experiences."
Eliot's medical school recommendations had a sound historical
basis. During the nineteenth century, medical education in Europe became both scientific and experiential.5 7 Medical education as we know it today had its origins in the training and
experiences of French doctors during the Napoleonic wars.5"
Eliot was greatly influenced by these developments in profes-

theory of breeding within itself its Corps of instructors and thus severs
itself from the great current of legal life which flows through the courts

and the bar, it commits the gravest error of policy which it could
adopt ....

Another feature to my mind of the same tendency is the extreme
unwillingness to have anything furnished by the School except the pure
science of the law. It seems to a layman that when the School exacts a
year more than any other of study for its degree, it might concede something, at least at the start, of their time to such practical training as
might be given successfully in such a school. I have never been able to
see why this should be thought belittling to the School or its instructors ....

If you[r] LLB at the end of his three years did not feel

as helpless on entering an office on the practical side as he is admirably
trained on the theoretical, I think he would begrudge his third year less.
SUTHERLAND, supra note 6, at 188-89 (1967) (alteration in original).
52. Id. at 157.
53. See Anthony Chase, The Birth of the Modern Law School, 23 AM. J. LEGAL

HisT. 329, 342 (1979).

54. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 6, at 178.

55. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 63.
56. Eliot said, "[Iln all departments of the University . . . a careful observation of
actual facts, an accurate recording of the facts determined, and a just and limited
inference from the recorded facts have come to be the primary methods of study and
research." Chase, supra note 53, at 336 (quoting CHARLES W. ELIOT, HARVARD
MEMORIES 65-66 (1923)).
57. See Weiner, supra note 23, at 72-73.
58. Id. at 51.
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sional, and especially medical, education. 9 He was also influenced by the more general movement toward scientific
methods.'
The early American reforms in medical education merged the
various experiences that physicians need for effective practice,
including a wide variety of methods of thinking and analyzing."' The resultant modern medical education combines a period of academic work to acquire a theoretical basis for practice,
followed by internship and residency periods in which new doctors experience the physician's activities and roles, reflect on the
theory and the experience, synthesize them, form new or modified theories, test them by experience, and so on.62 Since the
nineteenth century, medical students have been expected to
work in teaching hospitals as part of their academic experience.' A close, planned connection has been fostered between
the classroom and practical experiences of students and recent
medical school graduates." What happens in the medical teaching clinic has been "regarded as either a science [in itself] or as
a way of teaching medicine."65 Similarly, the case method of
law study has been regarded as either a scientific inquiry into
the common law or as a way of teaching law.66
Although Eliot might have preferred to establish a "teaching
hospital" for legal education, he became convinced that no such
thing was possible. In contrasting medical and legal education, Eliot reported in his 1873-1874 Annual Report on the state
of the university that:
[t]he medical student must spend a large part of his time in
hospitals; but a law student who should habitually attend

courts, except during the short period when he is acquainting
59. See Chase, supra note 53, at 340-42.
60. See id. at 334-35.
61. The Evolution of Graduate Medical Education in the United States, 56 J. MED.
EDUC. 7, 7-9 (1981) [hereinafter Evolution].
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. BOUILLARD, PHILOSOPHIC MADICALE 244 (1831)," translated in MICHEL
FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF THE CLINIC 115 (1973).
66. See LARSON, supra note 49, at 171-72.
67. Chase, supra note 53, at 341-42.
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himself with office work and practice, would waste his time.
The law library, and not the court or the law office, is the
real analogue of the hospital.6 8
His words echo Langdell's own: "[The library] is to us all that

the laboratories of the university are to the chemists and physicists, all that the museum of natural history is to the zoologists,

all that the botanical garden is to the botanists."69 Langdell
was Eliot's choice for the job of reforming legal education. Eliot
knew of Langdell from their days as Harvard students. 7 When
Eliot became President of Harvard, he found Langdell in New
York and brought him to Cambridge to further Eliot's reform
agenda.7 '
Langdell was not the only person interested in reforming legal
education and upgrading the legal profession at that time, but
other calls for reform were not as narrow as Langdell's in experiential terms.72 They more closely mirrored the medical education reforms that Eliot supported.73 These plans called for a requirement of apprenticeship, some portion of which could be
satisfied by law school attendance.74 Such plans implicitly recognized the need for both an academic and a practical experience to fully educate professionals. 5 Even the most ambitious
plans fell short of the medical education reforms in one crucial
respect that continues to flaw today's system of legal education.
Unlike medical education's teaching hospital, legal education's
apprenticeship, its broadly experiential portion, was disconnected from structured education. It was so under Langdell's reform

68. WARREN, supra note 50, at 392.
69. SUTHERLAND, supra note 6, at 175 (quoting Christopher Columbus Langdell,
Remarks to the Harvard Law School Association (Nov. 5, 1886)).

70. Id. at 159 (quoting Charles W. Eliot, Address at the Record of Commemoration, 250th Anniversary of Harvard College (1886)).
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., STEVENS, supra note 1, at 25 (describing bar leaders' efforts to require strict training and examinations before admittance to the bar); Concerning
Examinations for Admission to the Bar, 1 ALB. L.J. 350, 350-51 (1870) (arguing for
stringent entrance requirements for the bar).
73. Stevens, supra note 1, at 25.
74. Id.
75. See id.
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proposal; it was so under the alternative reform proposals; it
remains so today, with the post-law school experience of lawyers
awkwardly and by default serving as the broadly experiential
component of the learning process.
Although Eliot actually may have supported a more experiential education oriented reform of legal education than
Langdell--one that more closely resembled the medical education reform that he spearheaded-several factors led to the differences between medical and legal education reform efforts and
results. For instance, medical education had a history of experiential education as opposed to separate experiential learning
from which reform could proceed, but legal education did not.76
The European medical education model from which the American medical education reforms proceeded had already connected
the experiential aspects of the learning process within educational institutions." In contrast, the law apprenticeship system
existed as a separate and independent alternative means of
obtaining legal knowledge which coexisted with the university
system in place before Langdell.
In further contrast with law, medicine had a preexisting relationship with hard sciences. Medicine's connection with the more
respectable hard sciences made its place in the university more
secure and stable"8 because part of the motivation for reforming
professional education was the concurrent crises of professionalism. 9 Professions and professional education were in the process of institutionalizing and of separating their occupations
from an earlier identification with the trades."0 Medicine's connection to the highly respected hard science disciplines helped it
to clearly separate itself from the trades. Law could claim no
such preexisting relationship with hard science to insulate it

76. See generally Weiner, supra note 23, at 51 (describing the battlefield training
of 19th-century physicians in Europe).
77. Id.
78. PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, supra note 22, at 4-5 (noting the existence of "an
academic hierarchy, with the natural, hard, pure [sciences] having greater
prestige .

.

. than those of the soft, man-made, and applied.").

79. WILLIA

R. JOHNSON, SCHOOLED LAWYERS: A STUDY IN THE CLASH OF PROFES-

SIONAL CULTURES 58-59 (1978); STEVENS, supra note 1, at 20.

80. See STEVENS, supra note 1, at 20.
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from the crises: the choices were to present law as its own science (one that had elements in common with the hard sciences)
or to play on the law's more readily apparent relationship with
the less respectable social sciences. 8 Langdell, illustrated by
this classic quotation, chose to present law as a hard science: "If
law be not a science, a university will best consult its own dignity in declining to teach it. If it be not a science, it is a species of
handicraft, and may best be learned by serving an apprenticeship to one who practices." 2 Thus, medical education could "afford" a greater emphasis on practical skills than could law. It
did not have to swim upstream against currents of thought represented by Thorstein Veblen's remark that "a school of law no
more belongs in a university than a school of ... dancing." "
Huge disparities between the financial resources available to
medical and legal education flowed from medical education's
Medical
decision to emphasize the teaching hospital.'
teaching
and
research
of
laboratory
incorporation
education's
hospitals made it the target beneficiary of both government
grants and private philanthropy. 5 To achieve advances in medicine, the government and society turned to medical education.
In later years, with the onset of Medicaid and Medicare, government support for medical services for some of the patients of
medical education's teaching clinics and hospitals has also contributed to the financing of medical education.86 In contrast,
legal education's disdain for the experiential component denied
it an analogous path as the recognized source of advances in
substantive legal reform and justice system reform that may
have produced similar, though certainly more modest, contributions to its financing from government grants and private philanthropy.87 Thus, legal education's development was influ81. The latter path would have been incompatible with Langdell's views of law as
a hard science. This path was, of course, later taken up by the Realists. See, e.g.,
id. at 155-60.
82. Id.

at 52 (quoting CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES

ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS vii (1871)).
83. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA 23 (1965).

84.
85.
86.
1996,
87.

See LARSON, supra note 49, at 160-64.
Id.
Lynn Waldsmith, U-M Med Center Seeks a Cost Cure, DET. NEWS, Feb. 11,
at D1.
The modern exceptions mostly relate to the practical dimension: Ford
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enced by financial considerations to a far greater extent than
was medical school development. For example, high studentfaculty ratios and low-impact teaching methodologies became the
norm in law schools because these choices allowed law schools to
function in a fiscally responsible manner despite their lack of
medical education's advantages in outside funding.8
Because of medicine's relationship to the hard sciences, medical educators naturally turned toward laboratory and clinical
applications of scientific theory.89 Law had no ready analog to
the teaching hospital and legal educators did not need to look for
one. Law is different from medicine, after all. The roughly coincidental Flexner Report 0 on medical education and the Reed
Report 9' on legal education indicate as muchY The Flexner
Report blamed both people and institutions for medical
education's failures." Further, the report promoted a unitary
system of medical education modeled primarily on the Johns
Hopkins and Harvard medical schools.9 4 The. Reed Report criticized law as being flexible, diverse, and locally driven.95 Although the doctor would find the human body to be the same in
all locales at all times, Reed regarded the lawyer's subject of

Foundation's creation of CLEPR, William Pincus, The President's Report, CLEPR'S
FIRST BIENNIAL REPORT (1970), reprinted in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR LAW STUDENTS
21, 27-28 (1980), and government infusions of money to support clinics through
Legal Services Corporation grants and Department of Education grants, see infra
notes 218-21 and accompanying text. The current efforts of the W.M. Keck Foundation to support advances in legal ethics teaching seem undoubtedly connected to that
subject's close relationship to the practicing branch of the legal profession.
88. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 63 (stating that student-faculty ratios of 75-1 made
the Harvard Law School self-supporting).
89. See Ebert, supra note 48, at 41, 43-44.
90. Abraham Flexner, Medical Education in the United States and Canada, in
Bulletin No. 4, CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING (1910).
91. ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW (1921).

92. The reports are related by more than timing. Reed prepared his report after
the ABA Committee on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar asked the Carnegie Foundation to support a Flexner-style report for legal education. See Henry S.
Pritchett, Preface to REED, supra note 91, at xvii-xviii. For a comparison of the two
reports, see Michael Schudson, The Flexner Report and the Reed Report: Notes on the
History of Professional Education in the United States, 55 SOc. SCI. Q. 347 (1974).
93. See Flexner, supra note 90, at 143-55.
94. Id.
95. See REED, supra note 91, at 418-19.
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study as disorganized and unsystematic. 6 Unlike Flexner's proposal of a unitary system of medical education,97 Reed proposed
multiple systems of legal education, one for an elite group of
lawyers to represent corporate and government interests and
another-for which he thought night and part-time legal study
was particularly well suited-to train for more common local
matters representing, in large part, individuals." Of course, the
ABA rejected Reed's recommendations.99
Flexner aptly described the progress of medical education as
moving from an apprenticeship system, in which the student
simply observed disease, to the didactic process, in which the
student heard and read about disease, and finally to the modern
scientific and experiential model, in which the student returned
to the patient after reading and hearing about disease with
senses made infinitely more accurate and acute.' ° Although
most law teaching does not lend itself to the Flexner model,
professional responsibility law teaching does. Reading and hearing about the law governing lawyers and the legal profession
while experiencing the effects of that law on the role of the lawyer would be as useful for teaching professional responsibility
law as it has been for teaching medical diagnosis and treatment.
In the years immediately following Langdell's revolution,
professional responsibility law teaching in law schools was almost nonexistent.'' Schools regarded such teaching as either
implicit in the rigor of a university legal education. 2 or a subject better conveyed in practice after law school and licensure. ' The first Langdell-style casebook for legal ethics was
published in 1917,"04 later than texts for many other then-existing fields of law." 5 The courses that did exist were lecture-

96. Id.
97. See generally Flexner, supra note 90, at 143-55 (discussing reconstructing
medical education).
98. Schudson, supra note 92, at 352.
99. Id.
100. Flexner, supra note 90, at 20.
101. See MICHAEL J. KELLY, LEGAL ETHICS AND LEGAL EDUCATION 6 (1980).
102. WILLIAM K. FRANKENA, ETHICS 62-70 (1973); see KELLY, supra note 101, at 8.

103. See KELLY, supra note 101, at 5-6.
104. GEORGE P. COSTIGAN, JR., CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON LEGAL ETHICS (1917).
105. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE
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based as opposed to case-method-based courses that had little to
do with professional responsibility law.'0 6 Professional responsibility was taught either "pervasively," in the older sense of
that term 7 rather than in the revitalized, "Pervasive Method"
sense, 08 or through experiential learning once the lawyer entered practice. Except for the ABA Canons, which were themselves largely aspirational and based on outdated, mid-nineteenth-century moralizing, there was no well-recognized law of
lawyering to teach.0 9
In spite of the changes in jurisprudential thought brought
about by the Realists and by later jurisprudential thinkers,"0
few changes in legal education's methodology have occurred
since Langdell's time."' The subject matter that legal education covers has been expanded to include emerging areas of law
such as tax, administrative law, and environmental law. Further, legal education has embraced late-arriving social scienceoriented inquiries embodied in courses such as Law and Economics or Women and the Law."' As occurred in the early
Realists' time-the 1930s-this expansion of the curriculum was
accompanied by a modest shift of teaching materials and classroom methods away from formal legal interpretation and toward
social science discussions."
LAW OF CONTRACTS (1871).
106. See KELLY, supra note 101, at 7-8 (describing the pervasiveness approach as'

the concept that ethical training would be present in all substantive courses and
therefore separate professional responsibility courses were unnecessary).

107. See id. at 8.
108. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL IESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD xxix, 8 (1994) (discussing professional responsibility in the context of
regular courses).
109. See KELLY, supra note 101, at 5-9.

110. Critical, feminist, and race-conscious thought are fields that haV'e exploded in
recent years. See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTrOM OF THE WELL (1992); MOR-

CATHERINE
TON HORW1rZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW (1977);
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979); CATHERINE

A.
A.

MACKINNON, TOWARDS FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989).

111. Goebel, supra note 16, at 135 (describing Columbia Law School as "recognizably the same School" in 1891 and 1955); see KALMAN, supra note 14, at 96-97 (asserting that, beyond subject matter changes, few alterations in legal education resulted from the Realists' jurisprudential victories).
112. See, e.g., Goebel, supra note 16, at 314-27 (describing the addition of legal history, trusts and estates, and administrative law to Columbia's curriculum).
113. Id. at 338, 354-55 (describing institution of small-section first-year classes to
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Realists' early efforts to shift legal education in the direction
of clinical work" 4 effected little change.' 15 During the same
time period, dramatic changes in medical education, paralleling
some of the Realists' functional, fact-based organizational subject matter schemes,"' occurred at what is now Case Western
Reserve University. Innovative medical education reorganized
the medical school subject matter according to body systems,
deemphasizing the purer scientific disciplines." 7 Unlike the legal education changes advocated by the Realists, these medical
education reforms found favor and took hold."8
Despite the call for a more experiential model that accompanied the Realists' destruction of Langdellian formalism," 9 little
change in experiential legal education occurred until the Council
on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility (CLEPR) renewed the clinical study movement in the 1960s and 1970s."'
The clinical legal education movement represented a positive
but largely disorganized move toward experiential learning models in legal education.' 2 ' It is tempting to assume that CLEPR
was promoting the teaching of professional responsibility law,
but it was not, except under a very limited understanding of the
term. CLEPR was born in part from the idea of the Multiversity 2' of the 1960s; it was at its core a bottom-up legal service

emulate in a minor way the individualized instruction in medical schools and the
creation of the Legal Methods course).
114. See, e.g., Jerome Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303 (1947);
Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School? 81 U. PA. L. REv. 907 (1933)
[hereinafter Clinical Lawyer-School].
115. See KELLY, supra note 101, at 11.
116. KALMAN, supra note 14, at 46 (describing how Realists organized their
casebooks less according to doctrine and more according to factual situations).
117. See Evolution, supra note 61, at 7.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Clinical Lawyer-School, supra note 114, at 907, 910-13 (1933); Karl
N. Llewellyn, On What Is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 CoLUM. L.
REV. 651, 652 (1935); Nellie MacNamara, Teaching Legal Ethics by the Clinical
Method, 8 AM. L. SCH. REV. 241 (1935).
120. See William Pincus, CLEPR Looks Ahead, in 1973 NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 3.
121. See infra text accompanying notes 126-34.
122. "Multiversity" is a term used to describe a desire for education to focus on
fundamental issues of knowledge and value and service to society. Peter Brooks,
Introduction: Symposium on Interpretation in the University/Interpretation of the
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delivery reform." Supported by the Ford Foundation 24 and
led by William Pincus," CLEPR and the clinical legal education movement that it spearheaded introduced broader experiential education models into legal education 6 but taught -professional responsibility almost exclusively through exposing students to service to the poor. 27 Even the inclusion in CLEPR's
name of the words "professional responsibility" was in large
measure little more than political accident.'28 When the time
came to renew the grant for CLEPR's predecessor, the Council
on Legal Clinics, its name was first changed to the Council on
Education in Professional Responsibility and then to the Council
on Legal Education in Professional Responsibility, mainly to
satisfy qualms by the American Association of Law Schools
(AALS) about being associated with legal clinics.'2 9 Even Gary
Bellow's broader view of professional responsibility teaching
through legal clinics was not directed at professional responsibility law as much as it was aimed at the student's direct involvement with moral choice and exposure to the legal system, warts
and all. 3 Although certainly addressing one essential element
of professional responsibility, CLEPR's focus on service diminished the importance of the changed teaching methods for the
rest of legal education."' Indeed, clinical legal education took
on, with some encouragement from the rest of the legal academy, a separatist role." 2 Although the incredible success of the
University, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 75 (1994).

123. Pincus, supra note 120, at 3, 6.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 3.
126. See id. at 4.
127. William Pincus, The Lawyer's ProfessionalResponsibility, 22 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1,
3 (1969) ("The first item on the agenda of [professional responsibility] reform is the
extension of legal services.").
128. See id. at 25-27.
129. Id. at 26-27.
130. See Gary Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections on
Clinical Education as Methodology, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT:
LEGAL EDUCATION IN A SERVICE SETTING 374, 394-401 (1973) (Working Papers Pre-

pared for CLEPR National Conference).
131. See E. Gordon Gee, The Strengths and Weaknesses of ContemporaryLegal Education, in CONFERENCE ON LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE 1980S 15-18 (1982).

132. A. Kenneth Pye, On Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections on
Clinical Education as Methodology, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT
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clinical education movement has brought improvements in simulation teaching and externship placements, and has led to the
more frequent inclusion of role-sensitive activities in various
substantive law courses and in-house live-client clinics,' no
widespread, systematic connection between experiential education and professional responsibility law teaching has occurred."' For the move toward experiential education to take
firmer hold of its place as an equal partner of the more traditional classroom-oriented model of instruction, professional responsibility instruction must lead. For that to happen, classroom
teachers and experientially oriented teachers of professional
responsibility law must create a model for teaching this field
that takes advantage of both realms.
Thus, the basic model of the legal education enterprise has remained largely unchanged since Langdell's time, except for a
modest and separatist move toward the experiential model resulting from the clinical education movement. All of the changes
in legal education, aside from the clinical education movement,
have been about what is taught, not how it is taught.'35 The
mainstream of legal education remains almost as alien from the
apprentice system as at the time of Langdell's revolution,'3 6
and the clinical education movement has been separatist in
nature, striving to create a new component to legal education
that has its own scale, calibrated and set at an educational target that is separate from the rest of legal education." 7
The next revolution in legal education should begin with a
broadening of the base of the experiential learning of professional responsibility. This revolution should respond to changes in
the economics of law practice and training, the funding of clinical education, the connection of law faculty to the profession, the
needs of the public, the demands of students, and the accountability of higher education.
The development from the apprentice system to the Harvard

21, 23 (1973) (CLEPR Conference Proceedings).
133. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 216.
134. See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
136. See Gee, supra note 131, at 24-25.
137. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
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method of law school education would have been impossible
without reliance on post-graduation and post-licensure practice
as the primary and nearly exclusive source of enculturation to
the profession.' The profession would certainly not have been
better off today had the apprentice system defeated the law
school method in the early twentieth century.3 9 The progression from apprentice system to law school education and
enculturation by practice was a positive development; the problem is that the resultant separation of responsibilities between
the law schools and the profession may now have broken down.
'It is not broken because professionalism is declining; it is not
broken because law is too much like a business; it is not broken
because there are too many lawyers being produced by the law
schools. It is broken because the economics of law practice and
the social attributes of the work force, lawyers included, have
created circumstances within which the early twentieth century
model may no longer be able to function in the area of professional responsibility teaching. The system-law school followed
by enculturation in practice-may never have worked well for
lawyers who were without the support of a large firm or a government office system of mentoring. 40 It no longer works, in
any event, even for the lawyers for whom it once did. Plenty of
evidence demonstrates dissatisfaction with its current product:
MacCrate,' various bar association complaints,' conclaves
on legal education,
academics' critiques, including

138. See Clinical Lawyer-School, supra note 114, at 907-10.
139. But see George K. Gardner, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?-Some Reflections, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 800-02 (1934) (responding to Frank's proposals with an
explanation of the changed social conditions that would have made the apprentice
system a failure had it existed as the dominant method of legal education well into
the 20th century).
140. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 96.
141. See, e.g., LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCA-

TIONAL CONTINUUI, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR
REP. 4-6 (1992) [hereinafter LEGAL EDUCATION] (reporting the findings of a task
force chaired by Roger MacCrate).
142. See, e.g., .W. Taylor Reveley III, Time for a "Reverse" MacCrate?, EDUC. &
PRAC., Spring 1995, at 1 ("The bar relentlessly beats on law schools about their
pedagogy.").
143. See, e.g., VIRGINIA STATE BAR, CONCLAVE ON THE EDUCATION OF LAWYERS IN
VIRGINIA (Mar. 27-28, 1992).
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Kronman's"' and Glendon's,' 4 5 and the professionalism
movement begun by Burger.'46 Much of the blame for the
breakdown of this division of responsibility has been visited on
the law schools,'4 7 and progress toward reforming the system
will occur through the law schools' adjustments. Actually, the
bar has changed more than the law schools have in this time of
growing dissatisfaction. Though the changes made in law schools
have not always been the most carefully planned and orchestrated, most changes undertaken in law schools have brought about
improvements. 4 ' Section IV of this Article proposes a law
school program designed to assist in the repair and reform of the
system and to highlight the bar's responsibility to share the
financial burden of supporting those reforms.
In fact, late-nineteenth-century calls for alternatives to
Langdell's revolution were closer to what actually occurred in
practice than one might think. At least in the emerging law
firm, lawyers arrived with substantive education and proceeded
into an apprenticeship period under the guidance of the firm's
partners.'49 Now, however, even this experiential learning,
which has never approximated experiential education, is diminished to the point where its continued effectiveness is doubtful. 5' Although law school teaching methods have remained
relatively static, the extent to which the practicing branch of the

144. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993).
145. MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994).
"
146. A.B.A. COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM,
. . . IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:"
A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM, reprinted in 112

F.R.D. 243 (1986) (providing the report of a professionalism commission created at
the recommendation of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger).
147. See LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 141, at 6; STEVENS, supra note 1, at 238.
148. Compare Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized
Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42
FORDHAM L. REV. 227 (1973) (discussing the failure of both the bar and law schools
to provide sufficient training on lawyering) with Symposium, Teaching Legal Ethics,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995 (discussing existing and possible
programs for more effective teaching of professional responsibility) and Paul A.
Wolkin, Foreword to THEODORE VOORHEES, ON TRAINING ASSOCIATES vii (1989) (describing the recent retreat of law firms from "apprenticing" associates).
149. See VOORHEES, supra note 148, at 3; Wolkin, supra note 148, at vii.
150. Wolkin, supra note 148, at vii.
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profession has been delivering the already deficient experiential
learning regarding the profession and the law governing it has
declined.'
It may once have been true that a solo lawyer in a small community received sufficient guidance from his or her peers, and,
once upon a time, a new lawyer in a law firm probably received
the mentoring of a partner. Mentoring is much less common in
the 1990s, however, and for valid reasons. The relationship
between a new associate and a law firm is a much more tenuous
one today. Firms themselves are much less likely to be comprised of a lifetime commitment by commonly interested partners.'52 Associates leave their first employment at a much
greater rate than they did even twenty-five years ago.' 53 When
associates stay beyond the first few years, partnership prospects
are less likely than they were even twenty-five years ago.' If
an associate makes partner it will have taken a much longer
time to do so than it did even twenty-five years ago,' 55 and the
partnership attained may be of the recently developed nonequity
variety.'5 6 Partnership, even equity partnership, has changed
so that it is less likely to be57 a lifetime commitment than it was
even twenty-five years ago.
Another trend affecting professional responsibility training is
that major clients have altered the ways in which they consume
law firm legal services.' Some clients now hire law firm partners with the proviso that in-house employee lawyers of the
client will do the subordinate work for the law firm partner.'5 9
When the firm's own associates do the partner's subordinate
work, it is more likely to be narrow in scope. 60 For efficiency's
sake, today's associates develop narrow areas of expertise, rarely

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See STEVENS, supra note 1, at 216.
See RIcHARD L. ABEL, AiERiCAN LAWYERS 193-95 (1989).
Id.
See id. at 195.
See id. at 195-96, 222, 225.
Id. at 195.
See id. at 235.
See KRONMAN, supra note 144, at 283-91.
See id. at 284.
Id.
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seeing the breadth of the work being done for a client.161 Associate salary hikes in the early eighties also raised the stakes
on
162
contributions.
hours
billable
their
and
their performance
In such an environment, it seems natural that law firm partners mentor less and send associates to CLE and in-house training programs more. The investment of partner and associate
time in the sort of time intensive one-on-one development that
worked in the past makes little economic sense in today's legal
environment. The investment simply cannot be protected and is
far less likely to pay dividends compared to the recent past.
Developing a new lawyer's judgment is an expensive proposition.
It is an expense that is far less likely to be undertaken in an
environment where the law firm's interest in developing the
judgment of new lawyers has been diminished.
What once was a flawed but workable experiential learning
system for supplementing the law school education in professional responsibility has now become fatally flawed. To repair the
broken system requires new programs of experiential legal education that are supported, in part, by the practicing branch of
the profession. A sharing of responsibility for these programs
will diminish the free-rider problem that now discourages law
firms from engaging in the most expensive and most constructive forms of teaching.
IV. FROM DANA TO EMILY

Professional responsibility education should move toward a
program of instruction that places students in as many lawyerly
roles as is practicable. The key is that these experiences be supervised within an academic setting. Without question, the traditional classroom duties of analyzing and applying law must be
included in these new lawyerly roles. Professional responsibility
teaching must no longer, however, address this role as exclusively as it has in the past. It is not impractical to propose a threeyear program of experience and classroom instruction that incorporates three educational elements: (1) long-term comprehensive

161. Id. at 288-90.
162. See ABEL, supra note 152, at 190-95.
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simulation, (2) case, rule, and material reading with attendant
classroom discussion, and (3) live-practice placements. Such a
program of instruction is as close as legal education will, or
should, ever come to approximating medicine's teaching hospital.
Any remaining academic notions of disdain for practice, and
the associated feeling that academe must disassociate itself from
practice must continue to dissipate. This phenomenon is already
occurring, as similar anecdotal evidence from many great law
schools and the legal academy generally suggest." Dominance
in Langdell's era by the great treatise writers and doctrinal
scholars gave way to dominance in the Realist era by a faculty
group that held the work of the treatise writers in low regard, a
group for whom law itself was worthy of study only by virtue of
its connection with whatever happened to be their other discipline.'" More recently, a group of faculty that values the contributions of both groups and has an appreciation of the need for
a positive connection between law's practicing and academic
branches came into the contest for control between purely legal
doctrine and diverse doctrines of other disciplines.' 65
The long-standing acrimony between academy and practice is
particularly inappropriate in the context of professional responsibility teaching. The academy and the profession must jointly
accept the intellectual, academic qualities of professional responsibility teaching and the related disciplines of skills theory.
Doing so will acknowledge the adulthood of the study of law in
the academy and will accomplish two major goals. First, it will
foster both a reallocation of major legal employers' training
resources into informally pooled funds shared by the law schools,
in the same manner that Anthony Amsterdam predicted would
occur within the law school; 66 second, it will encourage government to reallocate live-client, in-house clinic resources to

163. Cf. Jeffirey S. Lehman, Message from Dean Lehman, L. QUADRANGLE NOTES,
Spring 1995, at 2; Robert E. Scott, Legal Education's Changing Market, UVA LAW.,
Summer 1994, at 4-5 (discussing the implementation of practice programs).
164. See LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 141, at 4-5.
165. See Michael J. Rost, Other States Learn from Virginia Conclaves on Education
of Lawyers, 41 VA. LAW. 43, 43 (1996).
166. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A 21st-Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612, 617-18 (1984).
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more generalized experiential learning programs. These developments will fill MacCrate's gap," 7 restore balance in the process
of students becoming lawyers and make economic sense.
A. Why Professional Responsibility Should Be Taught Through
ExperientialEducation
Anthony Kronman has said, "If Langdell is right, there is
nothing left for a practitioner to teach-nothing, in any case,
that a full-time academic with the time and inclination to pursue his subject scientifically cannot teach more ably."168 This
remark is a slight overstatement. Even if Kronman's idea of
Langdell's vision is correct, there is one thing better taught by
both experience and science than by science alone: the law and
ethics of lawyering. Professional responsibility should be taught
by the broadest possible experiential education model; it should
expose students to as many lawyerly roles as possible, including
the traditional classroom legal education role of lawyer as law
reader and analyzer.
The law of professional responsibility is the same as the law
of other fields in that it is about law, not "mushy pap." 169 It is
different from all other law fields in another crucial way: although the lawyer vicariously interacts with the law of contracts
and torts through clients' experiences, the lawyer directly experiences professional responsibility law as the central actor in all of
the relationships that professional responsibility law is about.
This difference suggests that experiential methods may be more
effective in the teaching of professional responsibility law than
in other areas of law.
It does not follow from this argument that the use of broad
experiential education models and methods are equally effective
to teach contracts or torts. The lawyer's need to understand the
law of contracts, torts, and all other areas of the law in which
the lawyer acts only in the role of expert, is satisfied quite well

167. See LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 141, at 3 (acknowledging the idea of a
"gap" between legal education and the realities of the profession).
168. KRONMAN, supra note 144, at 184.
169. Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story, and Commitment in the
Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 145 (1996).
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by effective use of the case method. The case method, when
applied rigorously, effectively simulates what the lawyer's interaction will be with the area of law being taught.70 Indeed, the
case method proves to be an active or experiential learning
methodology for learning most legal concepts. Furthermore, the
case/problem discussion method works quite well for teaching
some aspects of professional responsibility law.
The directness of the lawyer's interaction with professional
responsibility law, however, means that broader use of experiential education methods will be especially effective for teaching
that subject. Placing the student in the role of lawyer provides
the student with a context for learning the law of professional
responsibility. This context does at least two things: first, it
enhances the understanding and retention of the material by
providing for its immediate use, and second it modifies the reading material and the class discussion to reflect the nuances of
law that are only apparent in the experience of its application.
Legal education is, at the end of the day, professional education. One of the subject matters inherent in a professional education is education in the particular professional role.' Law
schools enroll students who either will be lawyers or will use the
skills and thought processes common to the lawyer's role. When
we put a student in the role of lawyer to facilitate the teaching
of professional responsibility law, we do so because that is a role
about which well-educated lawyers must have insight and because that role is central to the subject matter being taught.
Those basic insights about lawyering will be transferable to a
wide variety of circumstances. In contrast, the roles of contracting party or tortfeasor are not central to the law of contracts and
torts in the same way that the role of lawyer is central to the
study of the law of professional responsibility. To be sure, contracts do not happen without contracting parties, and torts do
not happen without tortfeasors. The law of contracts and the law
of torts, are, however, not as closely related to the role of the
affected parties as the study of professional responsibility is to
the role of lawyer. As a result, the rationale for placing the law

170. See STEVENS, supra note 1, at 52-55.
171. See PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, supra note 22, at 3-4.
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student in the role of lawyer for professional responsibility
learning is absent in the contracts and torts analog.
Placing students in the role of contracting party or tortfeasor,
nonetheless, would benefit them. They might gain some insight
into the businessperson's mind or an injured person's feelings
that would teach them about the elements of the law of torts or
contracts, but this experience is unlikely to be very meaningful.
Realistically simulating the lawyer's role is difficult, but it can
be done. Realistically simulating the role of a mass tort victim,
for example, would be a virtually hopeless effort that students
would not take seriously. Pedagogical interests also militate
against using clinical methods to teach roles other than that of
lawyer and subject areas other than that of professional responsibility law. Clinics do a reasonably effective job of teaching
substantive law topics;"'2 criminal law and procedure can be
taught in a prosecutor or defender clinic, for example. Clinics
give the student an immediate use of substantive material and
place the student in a specialized lawyer role."'
Further, various arieas of professional responsibility law rely
on what amounts to "trade usage."" 4 In professional responsibility law, unlike contracts, trade usage is a reference to lawyer
conduct: that is, how do lawyers lawyer. To teach this area without putting students in roles and requiring students to work
with and watch the functioning of lawyers is to miss the best
opportunity available for teaching this aspect of professional
responsibility law.
Trade usage differs from practice setting to practice setting.
Model Rule 4.1 defines the law governing negotiation conduct by
reference to what amounts to trade usage, implicitly creating a
rule of law that varies based on the activity undertaken by lawyers and lawyers' common understanding of the "rules" at play
during that activity." Acceptable rules of the negotiation

172. Pye, supra note 132, at 21, 23.
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 cmt. 2 (1995) (referring to the rules of negotiation and the expectations of lawyer-negotiators as determining those tactics that are false or misleading).
175. See id. (defining acceptable practices by reference to contract and agency law
principles).
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game in labor practice differ from those in family law practice or
criminal law practice. Although these differences to some extent
reflect differences in the substantive labor, family, and criminal
law, to an even greater extent they are the products of the varying practice cultures and norms within these different practice
settings.17 6 Therefore, although teaching professional responsibility law as a part of a variety of different substantive law
courses is helpful, the primary reason for doing so is to teach the
norms of the practice setting cultures that are attendant to the
substantive law field.'
The current "pervasive method" i"' advocates have the subject matter right, but the methodology wrong. They are right
that crucial connections exist between the law of lawyering and
the law of a variety of other substantive areas; indeed, no one
today would argue with the proposition that much of the law of
lawyering is the law of a variety of other subject matter areas.'79 The pervasive method falls short of the mark by failing
to place the student in any lawyerly role other than that of law
analyzer and applier, the same role that is the grist of traditional law teaching.
Although professional ethics law pulls principles from a variety of other substantive law fields, the same can be said of several other law fields typically taught in the second or third year,
such as corporate law. 80 Professional responsibility law uses
agency principles;'8 ' so does corporate law."2 Professional responsibility law uses tort principles;"8 so does corporate

176.
177.
178.
179.

See RHODE, supra note 108, at 4-5.
See id.
See id. at 5.
Id.

180. See, e.g., MICHAEL P. DOOLEY,.FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW, passim
(1995) (weaving theories of contract, tort, partnership and agency law into the study

of corporation law).
181. See, e.g., In re Goldstein, 85 A.2d 361, 363 (Del. 1951) ("[A] lawyer is not per."); MODEL RULES OF
mitted to traffic in his client's affairs for his own profit ....
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(b) (1992) ("A lawyer shall not use information re-

lating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client
consents after consultation .... ").
182. See, e.g., Haft v. Haft, 671 A.2d 413, 420 (Del. Ch. 1995) (discussing agency
powers regarding proxies).
183. See, e.g., Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704, 709-11 (Minn. 1962)
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law."M Professional responsibility law uses contract principles; 8 5 so does corporate law.'8 6 Professional responsibility
law, like corporate law, thus has a core of its own that in some
respects is dependent on "other law." Yet, no one suggests that
corporate law should be taught by sprinkling its instruction
throughout the various courses from which its substantive law
principles are drawn. Nor is it suggested that significant portions of the corporations course should be put into the hands of
other subjects' teachers when it also has its own course.
Even if we were wise to try to teach professional ethics law by
a pervasive method, that is, by teaching parts of it in a variety
of courses, this goal would be better advanced by focusing on the
practice settings typical of lawyers who are working with the
course's substantive law topics. This more effective approach to
the pervasive method would include focusing on trade usage'8 7
in the substantive classes in which ethics instruction is provided. For example, a corporations class should focus on the professional responsibility issues as they would arise in the typical
corporate law setting-in-house counsel or firm corporate attorney. A criminal law or criminal procedure course should zero in
on ethical issues that arise during criminal practice, such as the
prosecutorial responsibility to share potentially exculpatory
evidence with the defense," or the conflict of interest issues
that arise when representing multiple criminal defendants. 8 9
(voiding a contract because of fraudulent nondisclosure of material fact); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Terminology
4 (1995) (defining the terms
"fraud" and "fraudulent").
184. See, e.g., Combined Ins. Co. of America v. Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034, 1042 (Wyo.
1978) ("[A]s a matter of public policy and economic requirement, a master is liable
for damages caused by the negligence of his servant while acting within the scope of
the servant's employment.").
185. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d. 1016, 1019-22 (Fla. 1982) (regarding
application of contract rights analysis to lawyer discharge); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(a)(3) (1995).
186. See, e.g., Bourgeous v. Horizon Healthcare Corp., 872 P.2d 852, 856-57 (N.M.
1994) (discussing the concept of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
187. See infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
188. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992) (holding that a failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence will not exclude an otherwise valid indictment).
189. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (holding that representation of
multiple criminal defendants is not unconstitutional absent a showing of actual
conflict).
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In torts or products lialility classes an emphasis should be
placed on the potential pitfalls inherent in personal injury representation or insurance defense. For an administrative law class,
professional responsibility should be incorporated in a way that
would show students how such issues typically present themselves to government agency attorneys. The potential examples
are numerous as this approach could truly pervade all substantive courses. Scholarship on professional ethics law as it relates
to specific practice settings is current and rich." Some practice cohorts have attempted to draft model ethics rules for their
particular practice settings. 9 ' This material is at least as
much about the practice settings, and the attendant trade usage,
as it is about the imported law of torts, family law, administrative law, corporations, criminal law and so on.
The pervasive method as presently conceived is organized
around the wrong theme; rather than being divided up among
substantive law courses, the professional responsibility law field
should be organized around diversity of practice settings. In
other words, instead of asking torts and corporations professors
to teach the parts of professional responsibility law that come
from tort law or corporate law, for example, we would do better
to focus on the nuances in professional responsibility law that
are created by differences in practice setting. My way of doing
so, perhaps predictably, would be to create practice setting specific simulations that would run alongside the substantive law

courses.
Combining varied substantive law subject matter with matching role adjustments would produce the real benefits of pervasive ethics teaching. Creating practice setting specific simulations that run alongside the appropriate substantive law courses

190. See, e.g., Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government Yet? An
Answer From Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 1; Michael J. Maloney &
Allison T. Blizzard, Ethical Issues in the Context of International Litigation: "Where
Angels Fear to Tread", 36 S. TEXL L. REV. 933 (1995); Charles Silver & Kent
Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of Insurance Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE
L.J. 255 (1995); Symposium, Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children,
64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281 (1996).
191. See, e.g., Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers' New Code of Conduct Promotes
ADR, 2 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 259, 259 (1991).
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would, however, produce greater pervasive method benefits than
merely having the corporations teacher teach the aspects of the
law of corporations that are imported into professional ethics
law. Through these teaching, learning, and research vehicles
focused on the practice setting, we can fully develop a jurisprudence of lawyering.
B. A ProposedProgramDescription
The full proposed program would include these elements: (1) a
long-term comprehensive simulation; (2) case, rule, and material
reading with attendant classroom discussion; and (3) live-practice placements. Viewing the proposed program's organization
from another perspective, it includes a required program of comprehensive skills and ethics teaching similar to William and
Mary's two year course,"' combined with required externship
placements, and practice-setting-conscious simulation components in a number of elective courses. In a law school catalogue,
the program might look like this:
REQUIRED

Semester 1 Legal Skills and Ethics I - 3 credits
Semester 2 Legal Skills and Ethics II - 3 credits
Semester 3 Legal Skills and Ethics III - 3 credits
Externship - 2 credits
Semester 4 Legal Skills and Ethics IV - 3 credits
Externship - 2 credits
ELECTIVE

One of the four credits allocated to each of the following listed elective courses is earned in the appropriately designed
simulation experience: products liability, corporations, bankruptcy, international business transactions, public international law, administrative law, environmental law, social programs law, criminal procedure, juvenile law, and trusts and
estates.

192. For a description of William & Mary School of Law's Legal Skills Program,
see James E. Moliterno, Teaching Legal Ethics in a Program of Comprehensive Skills
Development, 15 J. LEGAL PROF. 145 (1990).
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The full proposed program would be the most ambitious professional responsibility teaching program in American legal
education. It would at once overcome the traditional
marginalization of professional responsibility teaching in favor of
recognizing the centrality of professional responsibility teaching
in legal education. It would do as much as reasonably could be
done to restore the balance that once existed, albeit only in limited practice circumstances, of classroom and broader experiential education. It could enhance moral development of law students, and therefore lawyers,'9 3 and it could increase lawyers'
perceptions of their preparation to face professional responsibility issues in practice."9 Finally, it would afford more classroom
hours for the teaching of professional responsibility law than
does the current two- or three-credit free-standing course.
The basic, required portion of the proposed program follows
the pattern of William and Mary's Legal Skills Program.'9 5 A
required externship component would be added to the current
William and Mary program, and the electives would be built
upon the basic program. At William and Mary, professional responsibility and professional skills-teaching, including research
and writing, is accomplished in a required, two-year program of
comprehensive skills and ethics development called the Legal
Skills Program ("Program"). The Program treats professional
responsibility and skills-teaching in the context of long-term,
comprehensive, simulated client service.
Program instruction proceeds concurrently on two tracks,
classroom instruction and simulated client representation. Because client representation is the methodological core of the
Program, the entire Program is organized around the simulated
student law office and its need to deliver effective, competent,

193. See generally Steven Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development Through Experiential Teaching, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 505 (1995) (arguing for an experience-based,
semester-length course in legal ethics).
194. See generally James E. Moliterno, Professional Preparedness:A Comparative
Study of Law Graduates' Perceived Readiness for Professional Responsibility Issues,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Sumner/Autumn 1995, at 259 (reporting results of recent
survey of lawyers with two to five years of practice regarding preparation for profes-

sional ethics issues).
195. For a more detailed description of the Legal Skills Program, see Moliterno, supra note 192.
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and ethical client service.
The client roles are played by other students as well as members of the community. All of the long-term roles, however, are
played by other students in the Program. Enough variations
exist on the fabricated legal problem so that no student plays a
role in a case in which his or her law office has any representational responsibility. Interestingly, the client role-playing has
itself proved to be a valuable learning experience for the students. Students serve four simulated clients over the two-year
course of the Program. The client issues vary from office to office, but each student works for clients on both civil and criminal matters and on both litigation and planning or deal-making
matters.
The Program also provides students with experiential ethics
education. The treatment of ethics within the context of the
simulations allows the simulated experiences to be more than
mere games. Although it is true that the deeply emotional impact of a live-client experience exceeds that of a simulated client
representational experience, the inclusion of ethics makes the
simulations much truer, better-textured representations of client
service. For example, teaching the professional responsibility
issues regarding truth-telling in negotiation in conjunction with
teaching negotiation tactics imbues the negotiating experience
with consideration of legitimate client and lawyer goals beyond
the mere victory over an opponent.
The inclusion of professional responsibility teaching speaks to
the sound criticism of the gaming that is involved in many practice skills programs. It matters that the students' clients are not
"9paper clients," they are individuals with whom the student
lawyers interact over the term of the simulation. Because the
Program does not separate professional responsibility teaching
from skills teaching, students engaged in a practice activity
must consider the moral and ethical dilemmas they will face in
the activity to at least as great an extent as they consider the
tactics and strategies. In fact, the goal is for the students to
come to see the ways in which technique and ethics connect with
the individual activities in which they have engaged.
The weekly class meetings nearly always include an element
of ethics, professional responsibility, and of the law of lawyering.
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Many of the classroom discussions are strikingly similar to discussions in a free-standing professional responsibility course,
except that they usually include no more than sixteen students.
Cases, rules, hypothetical problems, and readings that question
the value and wisdom of the rules form the basis of those discussions. Other class sessions are different from and richer than
the usual professional responsibility course discussion: rather
than focusing on appellate decisions or rules or readings, these
discussions focus on the recent simulated case experiences of the
students and the issues that have arisen, usually but not always
by our own design.
The benefits students glean from playing particular client
roles for a long term have been greater than we anticipated.
Many students have reported that walking a mile in the client's
shoes has given them a valuable perspective on the profession
that will make them more sensitive to client needs. A few have
reported an enlightening feeling of helplessness in their client
roles, particularly when the service being provided by their lawyers was unsatisfactory.
The problem materials and, thus, the simulated client service
that the student lawyers provide, are comprehensive. The simulations are comprehensive in the sense that they allow the students to represent the clients from a logical beginning point,
such as an initial interview, through a logical end point, such as
a successful negotiation or the conclusion of an appellate process. Because student associates can see the results of each
activity, they learn more about that particular activity. The
skills-teaching benefits of such comprehensiveness are obvious,
and the benefits are dramatic from an ethics teaching perspective. Unlike ethics teaching in isolated activities, such as onetime negotiation or interviewing exercises that appear and
quickly disappear, students in the Program interact on an ongoing basis with a single individual portraying a client, another
acting in the role of the adverse party, others serving as opposing counsel, and still others acting as court personnel. These
interconnections often continue for up to two years from case
beginning to case closing.
When students try a case in the Program, it is not canned,
packaged, or sterile- Rather, it is a case that they have devel-
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oped from initial client interview, through fact investigation,
research and writing activities, the filing of pleadings, motion
practice, discovery practice, to trial. The trials are transcribed by
student court reporters. Appellate work is based upon these
transcripts; the pleadings, motion and discovery papers, stipulations, proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law that the
students have filed during the litigation; and the trial court's
judgment. As a result, students get a very direct sense of the
consequences of their performance at trial. Because of the comprehensive and ongoing nature of the simulations, any poor
relationships must be repaired, unethical behavior of fellow
members of the "bar" must be reported under appropriate circumstances, and consequences of lawyering conduct must be
faced. Students' interaction with clients from beginning to end of
various matters gives them greater opportunities for reflection,
experiencing long-term the day-to-day activities and relationships of lawyering.
Because the Program replaces other courses in the curriculum, its costs are lessened by savings from not teaching the
replaced courses. The Program eliminated from William and
Mary's curriculum the research and writing course, an item on
which many schools spend considerable resources; an elective
negotiation course; an elective interviewing and counselling
course; a limited enrollment basic trial practice course; and the
required professional responsibility course. Portions of the teaching load of four tenured faculty, twelve adjunct faculty, fourteen
teaching assistants, and an administrative assistant are devoted
to the Program's operation. The total cost of the program is
approximately equal to the cost of offering the replaced courses,
including the cost of an average research and writing program
staff.
Unlike the current William and Mary Legal Skills Program,
the proposed program would make use of externship placements.
Advances in sophisticated externship placements and supervision enable the inclusion of the final pieces of the new format.
Students in these externships will be simultaneously enrolled in
the basic comprehensive simulation/ethics course. The
externships will serve an important purpose of clinical legal
education: the provision of a realistic forum for critiques of the
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profession. 9 ' Students can produce journals for review by their
faculty supervisor and report their externship experiences to
their small simulation/ethics course group. Their shared
externship experiences will enrich the simulation experiences in
the law school while the simulations will give students an analytical framework within which to experience and evaluate their
externship activities.
Adding a sophisticated externship component to the new skills
and ethics teaching program will improve community service,
another important interest of clinical legal education. Inevitably,
many of these required externship placements will be public
service placements. The brief externships, required of all students, will provide significant help to public service organizations, perhaps more than in-house clinics now provide. At some
schools, these externships will probably be tied to public service
graduation requirements. At those schools and most others,
required externships will expose more students to the public
service experience than do limited enrollment in-house live-client clinics. In many cases, more service will be provided than is
now provided by the estimated thirty percent of students who
are accommodated in in-house clinics at those schools that have
them. 197
Beyond the required program, the proposal would build an
ethics simulation into several elective second- and third-year
courses. Thus, through experiential education, the required
course utilizes the nexus between legal practice and professional
responsibility and combines it with simulations of specialized
practice settings. These can include: experiential in-house corporate counsel settings in the corporations course; plaintiffs' personal injury and insurance defense offices in torts or products
liability courses; government agency settings in administrative
law or environmental law; Federal Reserve or the International

196. See Robert J. Condlin, 'Tastes Great, Less Filling": The Law School Clinic and
Political Critique, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 45, 46-47 (1986).
197. Association of American Law Schools, Report of the Committee on the Future of
the In-House Clinic (1991), reprinted in 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 508, 522 (1992) [hereinafter AALS]. The percentage of students doing public service through in-house clinics
is actually somewhat lower because not every in-house clinic is a public service clinic. See id. at 520.
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Monetary Fund in international finance law; United Nations
agencies in public international law; legal aid or state human
services offices in child welfare or juvenile law courses; and
prosecutorial and public defender offices in criminal law and
procedure. This approach will produce the benefits of the pervasive method but in a managed way.
The final educational "product" therefore will include a foursemester, broad-based but general practice-oriented simulation
skills and ethics course "' combined with a coordinated variety
of simulations that are an integrated part of ten or more substantive law courses in a law school's curriculum.'99 The threeyear program would assume the goals and the course credits
formerly assigned to courses in professional responsibility, legal
research and writing, interviewing, negotiating and counselling,
appellate advocacy, pretrial advocacy, trial advocacy, and alternative dispute resolution as well as externship credits. This will
total approximately fourteen semester credits at most schools. It
will also account for about twenty-five percent of the credit
earned in ten or so other, three- or four-credit, elective, substantive law offerings. If the average student takes six of these electives, he or she will earn fourteen credits in the basic program
and six ethics credits from the elective substantive law courses.
The total of twenty credits of the typical eighty-six required for
graduation equals approximately twenty-five percent of the
credits needed to graduate.
Faculty members teaching the elective courses that include a
simulated ethics component will, quite naturally, resist intrusions into their turf. Like other modern workers in the twentyfirst century's sophisticated work force, however, law professors
may have to acclimate themselves to team-work situations.
Some professors may not be able to overcome the difficulties.
Most, however, will adjust just as practicing lawyers did in the

198. Other schools have establisled programs that combine some, but not all, of
the elements of William & Mary's program with explicit teaching of professional responsibility. See infra note 224.
199. See, e.g., Scott J. Burnham, Teaching Legal Ethics in Contracts, 41 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 105 (1991) (providing examples of how both substantive and ethical issues can
be taught in a contracts course to exemplify how substantive courses can help students answer the question, "What kind of lawyer do I want to be?").
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1980s and 1990s. Law practice's increasing complexity has
caused the multiple areas of law affecting the affairs of an individual client to become too much for any single lawyer to grasp
and manage.2"0 The phenomenon of lawyer teams working on
client matters is now commonplace.2"' Simply put, every sophisticated worker in society has needed to add interpersonal
workplace and teamwork skills to the skills previously required
to accomplish his or her respective job. 0 2 Workplace adjustment, focusing on lawyer teams, has increased in the 1980s and
1990s." 3 At least some law faculty members may need to employ a similar focus on teamwork.
The natural reluctance of upper-division elective course teachers to add a simulation component to their courses ultimately
will be overcome by experience. They will find that the simulations are not disruptive and that, in important ways, the simulations enhance their students' substantive learning experiences
while achieving the primary goal of enhancing students' understanding of professional responsibility.
Several factors will contribute to the successful adjustment to
team-teaching among formerly lone-actor faculty members. First,
simulation design and management expertise can be provided by
the staff of the basic skills and ethics simulation course. The
simulations can be created and executed in consultation with
teachers of the electives, but the main design and administrative
burden need not be on those faculty members. This efficient
arrangement would take advantage of the relative expertise of
the available personnel.
Second, the simulations can be flexible in duration and intensity. Some faculty members may prefer to have a nearly semester-long simulation running alongside the substantive law
course, while others may prefer a shorter simulation. Third,
faculty involvement in the simulation can vary from course to
course. Some instructors will choose to be central characters in
the simulation's execution, while others may prefer that the
200.
REV.
201.
202.
203.

See Mary Twitchell, The Ethical Dilemmas of Lawyers on Teams, 72 MINN. L.
697, 705 (1988).
Id. at 701.
Id.
See id. at 764-66.
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simulation be executed by others and run parallel to their courses. Fourth, substantive law professors will see an enhancement
of their own teaching experience resulting from the benefits of
teaching students who have a simultaneous practice context for
the area of substantive law being taught. Such students should
be able to move beyond rudimentary issues more quickly, allowing the teacher to explore the substantive area more deeply and
from a wider variety of perspectives than had been possible
before.
A typical, elective, substantive law course simulation would
have the following characteristics. The skills/ethics program
staff would work with the substantive law faculty member to
plan the extent of the simulation, which may run anywhere from
two weeks to the full length of the semester. The staff and faculty member would discuss the primary issues that should be
addressed through the simulation. In products liability, the
issues may be contingent fee structures and multiple client conflicts of interest; in juvenile law, issues may include the limits of
confidentiality when a lawyer is aware of child abuse, confidentiality in the mediation context, and paternalism in lawyer-client
relationships; in corporations, the simulations could address
client-as-entity issues, client fraud, and attorney-client privilege
in the institutional setting; in criminal procedure, concerns
might include the nature of the prosecutor's role, client pejury,
and witness preparation. In short, the professional responsibility
issues would be culled from those that might be covered if the
current description of the pervasive method were being used.0 4
Several simulations would be designed, mainly by the
skills/ethics program staff, for the particular practice settings
relevant to the substantive law course. Role players from within
and from outside the law school community would be located
and given their respective character descriptions and fact pattern instructions. Students in the course would be divided into
working groups of between four and six, depending on the complexity of their client's representational needs, and groups would

204. RHODE, supra note 108, at 4-5 (describing the pervasive method as an approach addressing questions of professional responsibility "throughout the curriculum
as well as in courses specifically focused on the legal profession").
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receive representation settings and client representation responsibilities. Both the skills/ethics staff and the Substantive law
course teacher would monitor and execute the scenarios in combination.
One scenario in the criminal procedure course, for example,
might involve a mid-level drug dealer who is charged with various crimes and who is in hiding. The drug dealer, through his
attorneys (a working group of four students) is seeking preferential treatment from the U.S. Attorney's Office (another working
group of four students) in a particular location in exchange for
revealing information about the organization for which he
works. The attorneys' negotiations proceed. The prosecutors
must identify the legitimate interests of the government. Later,
the defense lawyers learn that their client is attempting to gain
his advantage in exchange for false information that they have
to that point unwittingly been giving to the U.S. Attorneys. The
defense lawyers now must determine their obligations to the
prosecutors in this situation. The defendant then calls one of his
lawyers, at night, to tell her that while the authorities have not
found him, his co-conspirators have and that he is in great danger. Over the telephone, the lawyer hears the sound of gunshots,
a door being broken down and glass shattering. The telephone
line goes dead. The lawyer wonders whether to call an ambulance or the police. The next morning the defendant calls again
to report that he narrowly escaped from his co-conspirators the
night before. Losing confidence and patience with his defense
lawyers, the defendant calls one of the,prosecutors directly. The
prosecutor must consider how the contact with opposing, represented parties rules should apply to him as a prosecutor." 5
From there, depending on the actions taken by the prosecutors
and the defense lawyers the scenario proceeds to a conclusion in
one of several possible directions. All of this activity would occur
over a four- or so week period during the semester.
Eventually, the program might facilitate simulations that
involve scenarios that cut across substantive course lines. In
such a simulation, for example; students in a social programs
course could work in a simulated state attorney general's office
205. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule

4.2 (1995).
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representing the state child services administration, students in
a juvenile law course could work in a simulated legal aid office
representing a pregnant teenager who is contemplating an
abortion, students in a health law course could represent a hospital at which the pregnant teenager seeks abortion services,
students in a family law course could represent prospective
adoptive parents who seek to place an advertisement offering
extraordinary benefits to birth parents who will give them a
healthy child for adoption, and students in a First Amendment
course could represent the newspaper in which the prospective
adoptive parents place their advertisement. The multiple interactions among such a group of clients would make for a fascinating, invaluable semester for the students.
On the merits of the educational experience for students, the
debates have long been framed as in-house clinic versus
externship °6 or in-house clinic versus simulation0 7 contests.
Those debates were argued long, fully, and well." 8 The proposed program's combination of simulation and externships in a
single coordinated program, however, changes the parameters of
that debate. Every advantage of in-house clinics over either
externships or simulations standing alone can be countered by a
similar strength originating from the combination of externships
and simulations. For example, although in-house clinics have an
advantage over simulations in providing service to the community, externships can provide as much or more service."' Although in-house clinics have an advantage over simulations in
exposing students to real-life situations, externships are more
realistic than in-house clinics because students are placed in the
actual legal aid office, to take one example, rather than in the
law school's internally created model of a legal aid practice.210
Likewise, although in-house clinics offer more predictable supervision than externships, simulations can be more stably and
predictably supervised than in-house clinics. Although in-house

206. See, e.g., Condlin, supra note 196, at 63 (discussing benefits and drawbacks of
in-house clinics and-external practice settings).
207. See supra notes 119-34 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 119-34 and accompanying text.
209. See Condlin, supra note 196, at 63-74.
210. See id.
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clinics offer more predictable levels of quality work than
externships, simulations are created and managed with the
express purpose of providing even levels of work, escalating
levels of challenge, varying case types and issues, and consistent
opportunities to see client matters through to completion. The
advantages of different aspects of both externships and simulations over in-house clinics remain valuable features of the proposed coordinated program. Advantages of the in-house clinic
over either externships or simulations standing alone will become largely irrelevant.
C. How To Pay for The Program
While it may be entertaining to propose curricular developments without regard to their funding, the economics of such
proposals can never be ignored.n
1. ReallocatingExisting Resources
A program such as the one proposed does not require as many
new resources as may appear at first blush, at least at schools
that now spend average amounts on legal research and writing
courses and programs."' Such a program would replace courses already in the curricula of most law schools, and can make
use of the resources. now allocated to those courses. The proposal
replaces the freestanding professional responsibility, research
and writing, appellate advocacy, basic trial advocacy, interviewing, negotiating and counselling, and pretrial practice courses,
and also replaces some elements of an alternative dispute resolution course. 2" These classes already exist at most
schools. 2 4 As such, most of the resources needed to fund the

211. John C. Weistart, The Law School Curriculum: The Process of Reform, 1987
DUKE L.J. 317, 334-36.
212. See Ken Myers, Professors Say Legal Writing Is More Than Just Another Skill,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 15, 1994, at A16.
213. As the evidence now shows, lawyers who have experienced the basic, broadbased component of the program regard their own preparation for ethics issues in
practice, research, writing, advocacy, interviewing, counselling, and negotiating as being significantly superior to graduates of more traditional skills and ethics curricula.
See Moliterno, supra note 192, at 35-51.
214. See Myers, supra note 212, at A16.
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proposed program need only be reallocated, not generated
anew." 5 Some additional resources will be needed, however,
and the following ways of generating them should prove more
than adequate.
2. Foundationor Government Support
Law schools have not traditionally been the recipients of foundation or government support in the way that medical schools or
hard science programs have been.2 16 Therefore, almost any
funding from such sources is new. Broadly viewed, the professional responsibility of lawyers is perhaps chief among law
school subject matter with a direct and substantial link to the
public interest. The W.M. Keck Foundation has recognized as
much in its program to support advances in the teaching of
professional responsibility.1 Other grant-giving organizations
will take up the cause as the case is made for the importance of
professional responsibility teaching to protect the public interest.
Government support in the form of Legal Services Corporation
(LSC) funding and Department of Education funding, of course,
has been threatened." 8 LSC has traditionally supported liveclient clinics." 9 In the competition for what remains of government support for legal education beyond the next budget crises,
grant proposals for portions of the proposed program that involve service (the externships) could begin to fare well, especially as LSC increasingly focuses on service-per-dollar.2 20 The
externships will reach more students and arguably provide more
service to the public than do in-house, live-client clinics.2 21

215. See id.
216. See STEVENS, supra note 1, at 283 n.35.
217. For descriptions of the programs thus far supported by the W.M. Keck Foundation grants, see LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, passim.
218. Sarah Neville, Legal Aid Agency Faces Cuts in Funds, Authority, WASH. POST,
Sept. 14, 1995, at A21; Jane B. Quinn, In Defense of Legal Services for the Poor,
WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1996, at H2.
219. AALS, supra note 197, at 552 n.3.
220. See Neville, supra note 218, at A21.
221. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
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3. Self-Perpetuation and Redistribution to Successful
Programs
It is in the self-interest of law schools to support programs
like the one proposed. Student and employer demand will produce economic incentives for law schools to better prepare graduates for lawyering. Schools that can effectively implement such
models while maintaining the quality of their core teaching of
doctrine and analysis will, over time, enjoy a competitive advantage over other schools, eventually making the implementing
schools successful ones. Employers who are not doing their own
educating" and enculturation will prefer to hire graduates of
the implementing schools. Placement data will then influence
prospective students' choices, and private dollars largely in the
form of alumni giving will flow. Private funds can be raised to
support professional skills teaching programs. For example,
schools such as the University of Michigan and the University of
Virginia have recently begun new skills-teaching offerings that
are largely supported by private funding.2 23 Programs that can
offer advances in professional responsibility as well as in skills
areas provide competitive advantages that will ensure that such
funding will flourish. Several schools have begun steps in the
direction of the proposed program, with support from a variety
of sources.2"
In the longstanding tradition of law schools, as faculty inter-

222. Few employers are doing their own educating. See VOORHEES, supra note 148,
at vii. Remember also the distinction between educating and providing learning opportunities. See supra notes 22-43 and accompanying text.
223. See Lehman, supra note 163, at 2; Scott, supra note 163, at 4-5.
224. See Ted Gest, Realism on the Docket: Building a Case for More Clinical
Training of New Lawyers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 23, 1992, at 70. New
York University has had in place for several years a lawyering course without the
explicit ethics teaching component; William & Mary has had the basic two-year program in place since 1988, Moliterno, supra note 192, at 146; Northwestern University has an advocacy and professional responsibility course, Karen Wagner, Northwestern University School of Law's Dean Stepping Down: Improve Our Ranking Is Advice
for Whomever Fills His Post, ILL. LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 1994, at 13; Temple University
has an advocacy/evidence/professional responsibility course and a trusts and estates/professional responsibility course, ABA Annual Meeting NYC '93: Awards,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 6, 1993, at 7; Loyola University of Los Angeles has an advocacy/professional responsibility course, Michael E. Wolfson, Professional Responsibility
As a Lawyering Skill, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/August 1995, at 297, 299.
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ests turn toward activities like the proposed program, schools
will begin implementing it. Live-client clinicians are moving
toward both simulation and externship teaching, and classroom
teachers of substantive law courses are adding simulation components, especially ethics-related ones, to their courses.225
This phenomenon seems to be happening on its own, without
any particular addition of new resources, and seems likely to
continue.
4. Support from the Profession and the Organized Bar
The profession, particularly the organized bar, should, for
varied reasons, support law schools' movement toward the proposed program. Before the days of high lawyer mobility, the
serious onset of which occurred in the late 1970s,228 law firms
invested a great deal of time and money in the training and
enculturation of new lawyers.22 7 This training investment did
not always take the form of formal training programs, more
often it was the result of large amounts of nonbillable or reduced-billable time being spent by partners and associates alike
working through multiple document drafts and discussing case
management and client relations issues. 8 This intensive investment changed form and was greatly reduced in the 1980s
and 1990s when it no longer made economic sense: law firms
could not protect their investment because associates frequently
departed, taking their training with them; lower percentages of
associates became partners; and associate salaries increased
sharply, making such an investment of time far more costly.2
Major employers changed the way in which they trained new
lawyers, moving from time-intensive and expensive mentoring to
more formal training programs that demand less of partners'

225. See, e.g., Burnham, supra note 199, at 108-11 (discussing the addition of ethics
simulations in contracts courses); Ian Johnstone & Mary Patricia Treuthart, Doing
the Right Thing: An Overview of Teaching Professional Responsibility, 41 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 75, 99-100 (1991) (discussing the use of simulations in substantive courses).
226. See ABEL, supra note 152, at 185-95.
227. See LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 141, at 299-301.
228. See VOORHEES, supra note 148, at 3-4.
229. ABEL, supra note 152, at 194-96.
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time." °
Major employers, perhaps through the organized bar, have a
responsibility to contribute to reform. Because the proposed
three-year program is designed to fill the gap left in the legal
profession when firms moved away from their extensive programs of enculturation and mentoring, firms should redirect
some of their resources to law schools for providing this necessary function to the profession. Individual .employers will no
longer use the resources in the old way because an employer
cannot protect its investment. Shifting the use of the resources
to law schools will enhance the qualities of the typical entrylevel lawyer.
The organized bar eventually will contribute to this reform as
well. The bar, looking for someone to blame for the late-twentieth-century professionalism crisis has responded as it did during
the late-nineteenth-century professionalism crisis; it has turned
its gaze on law schools."' In the nineteenth century, the bar
worked to establish higher educational standards. 2 and encouraged the Harvard-style law school reforms as a way to further the profession's public image and stature." In the current professionalism crisis, the bar has turned once again toward law schools to express its dissatisfaction with the services
of the new lawyers whom it is no longer willing to enculture
during employment. 4 Several state bars have convened socalled "conclaves" on the education of lawyers for the dual purposes of venting the bar's frustration with what it thinks is happening in law school and of fostering a dialogue about the relative roles of the bar and the law schools in training new lawyers. 5 The law schools told the bar that they could only train
more effectively if student-faculty ratios could be reduced and
that such reductions were impossible unless the bar would help

230. For an illustrative course plan, see VOORHEES, supra note 148, at 3-7.
231. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 57-64 (discussing the reaction of the organized bar
to late-19th-century problems with the legal profession).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 141, at 6.
235. See Rost, supra note 165, at 43.
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to foot the bill.2"' Given proper urging, the bar may respond favorably, perhaps by creating programs that resemble the Interest On Lawyers' Trust Accounts (IOLTA) schemes 7 to raise
money for skills and professional responsibility teaching in law
schools. These funds could effectively consolidate the bar's training investments in a way that would spread the financial burden
and protect the individual employer's investment. The bar may
be induced to explore such support for the same reasons it supported educational reform during the last crisis in professionalism; to improve the public perception of the profession."'
V.

CONCLUSION

Legal education's encounters with experiential education have
been less than illustrious. One aspect, the mental processes
associated with reading and analyzing appellate cases, has dominated the methodology of legal education since the universitybased legal education revolution. This case-reading focus, although incredibly important to lawyering, is both narrow and
narrowing for the student. Legal education could not and should
not have developed with the dominant experiential learning base
that medical education enjoys. A useful movement toward experiential education, albeit disorganized, has occurred through the
innovations of the clinical legal education movement.
A proper response to a changing legal practice environment
would incorporate a stronger and better-organized movement
toward experiential legal education. This movement most appropriately should emerge from the professional ethics teaching
area. Creating experiential models for the education of lawyers

236. LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 141, at 390.
237. See Risa I. Sackmary, IOLTA'S Last Obstacle: Washington Legal Found. v.
Massachusetts Bar Found.'s Faulty Analysis of Attorneys' First Amendment Rights, 2
J.L. & PoLY 187, 188-92 (1994) (discussing the history of IOLTA plans). The IOLTA
schemes, begun in the 1980s, serve as a mechanism by which the interest on client
trust accounts is directed to organizations that provide legal services to the poor. Id.
In fact, the IOLTA schemes do not cost lawyers anything because the interest belongs to clients whose money is on deposit. See id. Before IOLTA, the banks reaped
the benefits of lawyers' using non-interest-bearing checking accounts for client trust
purposes. See id.
238. See STEVENS, supra note 1, at 57-64 (discussing the reaction of the organized
bar to the late-19th-century problems with the legal profession).
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that are about the ways in which lawyers behave and about
professional ethics and professional techniques can usefully
advance the teaching and learning of professional ethics law and
practice.

